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1. Introduction"
Most observers of economic events have noticed a consi-
derable increase in the general volatility of prices over the
last decade. An important byproduct often attributed to this
increased price variability is greater uncertainty perceived
by individual decisionmakers in the process of formulating in-
tertemporal plans. This paper seeks to clarify and provide
some extensions to previous theoretical work on the question of
how economic agents adjust to increased price uncertainty in
the context of the competitive firm. In particular, the question
asked is whether the optimal choice of inputs in a competitive
firm is affected by the advent of increased factor and output
price uncertainty. The answer given in earlier studies such as
those by Baron (1970), Batra and Ullah (1974), Leland (1972) and
Sandmo (1971) is quite straightforward: If competitive-firm
managers are risk-neutral profit maximizers, the optimal input
mix remains unaffected by increased uncertainty, while under
risk-averse managers, firms either reduce their scale of opera-
tions or adjust their input mix towards relatively greater use
of less risky inputs. A similar result is advanced in Holthausen
(1976), who treats this issue in the context of demand uncertain-
ty and finds that under risk neutrality only the behavior of
price-setting imperfect competitors is affected. The analysis
by Stewart (1978), written explicitly for the case of factor-
price uncertainty, adds further support to these conclusions.- 2 -
Before discussing other subsequent treatments of this
issue, it might be useful to point out what led these authors
to their conclusion. In all cases mentioned so far, a rather
crucial limitation is placed upon the intertemporal choice flexi-
bility available to the firm, namely, it is assumed that all
input choices are made under the same amount of uncertainty.
This may be illustrated by briefly examining the typical analytic
framework employed in these studies: A competitive firm maximizes
expected profits subject to a production function relating out-
put to two factor inputs, say capital and labor. The fixed input,
capital, takes time to install and therefore must be chosen ex
ante, before the market price of output or of the other input
is known. Ex post, after the random price variables take on
actual values, the firm is left free to choose an optimal level
of the variable input, labor. However, additional constraints
are then generally imposed which, in a two-factor setting, do
not allow for any ex post freedom of choice. Either the firm is
constrained to produce at a predetermined output level or to
meet all demand at the market price. In both cases, the decision
on how much of the variable factor to use was effectively made
prior to the realization of the random elements. It is easy to
see, then, that if output and both inputs are chosen ex ante,
the ex post profit is a linear function in both factor and out-
put prices. Its expected value is therefore invariant to changes
in the probability distributions, of.these prices, provided their
means are held constant. Within this framework, the only channel- 3 -
left by which changes in uncertainty could have non-neutral
effects is through the possibly risk-averse behavior of a
firm's managers. However, the introduction of risk-averse be-
havior into the theory of the firm raises a number of well-known
problems, and thus has met with only limited acceptance among
economists. The main problem being that risk-averse behavior on
the part of firm managers cannot be justified on the same grounds
as risk-averse behavior among individual households. With well-
functioning markets, the most efficient allocation of resources
would result with firms maximizing expected profits while asset-
owners, which includes the managers, hold appropriately diver-
sified portfolios depending on their risk preferences. It would
therefore be in the interests of stockholders to choose risk-
neutral behaving managers.
Subsequent work on this question has recognized that in
general firms do have more room to maneuver in the face of in-
creased uncertainty than was implied by the preceding example.
This is done by relaxing the assumption that all effective deci-
sions are made under the same uncertainty, but that some can be
postponed until after the uncertainty is resolved. It is intui-
tively apparent that with the ability to postpone decisions a
firm can increase its ability to respond to realized variations
in prices. That this could benefit the firm was already recog-
nized by Hart (1942), who concluded that when production deci-
sions can be staggered so that some input choices can be deferred- 4 -
until at least part of the uncertainty has been resolved, the
firm's expected value of profits could be raised above the value
that would result if all decisions had to be made before the
realization of the random elements. However, the acquisition of
this response flexibility will also in general involve some' costs.
Fuss and Me Fadden (1978) have drawn attention to the existence
of a tradeoff between the degree of production technique flexi-
bility chosen by the firm and the static, or on-average, effi-
ciency of a production process. See also Stigler (1939), for a
ground-breaking contribution in this respect. What these results
imply is that changes in uncertainty associated with increased
price variability can have an effect on the optimal structure of
the firm for reasons independent of the managers' attitudes to-
ward risk. Hartman (1976) also points this out in his analysis
of factor demands by competitive firms, using the typical model-
described earlier, but relaxing the assumption that output be
held fixed exogenously. In order to obtain a determinate solu-
tion in this case, however, it became necessary to assume de-
creasing returns to scale in production. This raises a different
problem. What has to be explained under this assumption is why
firms would not continue to split themselves up into smaller
equal-sized units as this would, bring about greater output at
no increase in costs. In Hartman (1972) this problem is avoided
by introducing the nowadays more accepted notion of costs-of-
adjustment in investment to make the size of the firm determinate,
But since this analysis takes place in the context of a dynamic- 5 -
model of the firm, the results obtained there are not readily
comparable to the others. (This model is discussed in greater
detail below). Finally, Perrakis (1980) reexamines the problem
posed in Stewart (1978) but arrives at different conclusions,
namely that the optimal capital intensity choice will not remain
invariant to changes in uncertainty even under risk-neutrality.
In terms of the typical framework earlier, this result is
achieved by introducing more than two factors of production in-
to the analysis, several of which are variable in the short-run.
Unfortunately, on account of a minor error, Perrakis erroneously
concludes that, "Under risk neutrality,... / uncertainty in the
prices of some inputs_7 ••• results in most cases of practical
interest, in a heavier relative use of the riskless input as
compared to the certainty case with input prices set equal to
their expectations." (p. 1086). In fact, the opposite occurs,
as will be shown in the next section.
In section 2, the analysis first presented in Perrakis
(1980) is reconsidered and corrected. This model is then ex-
tended in section 3, by relaxing the assumption that the output
produced by the firm be a predetermined constant. This analysis
builds on the model presented, in Hartman (1972) . The results ob-
tained here are similar to those derived in Hartman (1976), to
which a more detailed comparison follows. Overall, the conclu-
sions obtained in both sections come out guardedly in favor of
the proposition that the advent of increased price uncertainty ,- 6 -
induces the risk-neutral competitive firm to reduce the capital
intensity of its input mix. It still remains true in both cases
that the separate introduction of risk-averse behavior would
tend to operate in the opposite direction, as earlier authors
had found, so that the net effect under this assumption would
be indeterminate. However, in the subsequent analysis, the ef-
fects of risk-aversion will be ignored, both in order to isolate
the effects of uncertainty which operate through a pure profit
motive,and for dissatisfactions on theoretical grounds,attached
to the risk-aversion assumption, which were touched upon ear-
lier. The final section summarizes the conclusions and discusses
some of the broader implications.
2. The Model of a Risk-Neutral Competitive Firm Producing a
Fixed Output
The production function of a neoclassical firm is charac-
terized by constant returns to scale in capital K and n variable
factors, {x.. ,... ,x }. Output is sold in a competitive market at
price p. The firm is also faced with a competitive market for
factor inputs, whose prices are denoted wK (for one unit of ca-
pital), and w1,....,w , for the variable factors.The firm re-
gards p and {w1,...,w } as independently distributed random va-
riables with known means and variances.
The firm must make the following decision: Because it takes- 7 -
time to install capital, the level of K must be chosen before
the values of the random variables are realized, while x.,...,x
are then chosen after their realization. Conceptually this can
be restated in reverse order. For any given stock, K, the firm
chooses a variable factor mix which maximizes ex post profits,
depending upon the realized factor prices. This results in a
set of conditional demand functions, {x1,...,x }. The firm then
chooses an optimal K which maximizes the expected value of the
conditional, ex ante profit function. Now, it turns out that
under constant returns to scale the e_x ante profit function is
linear in K, so that the optimal level of K is indeterminate.
To overcome this problem it will be assumed that the level of
output to be produced is exogenously predetermined. This problem
is reconsidered in section 3.
The ^x post objective of the firm is then to
(1) Maximize pQ - W..X.. - ... - w x - wRKr
ix.. , . . . ,x i
subject to Q = F (_ K, xj,..., *n_7' Q/ K both fixed. .
Performing the operation leads to a set of conditional factor
demand functions, {x7 (Q, K; w.. , ..., w )}, which do not involve
p. The ex ante conditional profit function may then be written
as
«* «* »*
(2) iT = pQ - v^x'j - .. . - wnx^ - wKK
= pQ - C(Q,K; wr ...,wn) - WKK,- 8 -
where C(-) is the firm's variable cost function corresponding
to the production function ¥(_ • J.
The ex ante objective of the firm is then to maximize the
expected value of n given by (2). Performing the differentia-
tion yields
(3) -E /"CK(Q,K;w1,...,wn)_/ - wR = 0,
where E is the expectations operator taken over all random va-
2
riables. The second-order condition for a maximum is
(4) -E CRK(.) < 0, or E CRK > 0.
We are now in a position to evaluate the firm's optimal
response, in choosing K, to increases in uncertainty. The notion
of increased uncertainty employed here (and also in most of
the connected literature) is that the random variable in question
undergoes a mean-preserving spread. Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1971) established the result that the expected value of a con-
cave function decreases as its argument undergoes a mean-preserv-
ing spread, and increases for the case of convex functions.
Therefore, if Cv is a convex function of w., increased uncertain-
ty will raise the value of E / Cv /, which would warrant a de-
crease in K (since E / Cvv / > 0) in order to reestablish the
maximizing condition (3). Conversely, if Cv is a concave func-
tion of w., the optimal response to increased variable factor
price uncertainty is to increase K.- 9 -
From duality theory we know that the variable cost func-
tion C(K, Q; w*,...,w ) is concave in factor prices. However,
this property does not necessarily carry over to the partial
CR(•). What can be said at this stage is simply that, contrary
to the original neutrality results, the optimal capital inten-
sity of a risk-neutral competitive firm will change in response
to increased factor price uncertainty. Now, if we place some
restrictions on the production function it is possible to give
a more definite answer. Consider then the set of functions of
the form
(5) F l~K, x.j,..., xn_/ = F l~K, g (x., , . . ..,xn) _/,
where the function g(x1,...,x ) is homogenous of any degree
other than 0 in all its arguments. This restriction is satis-





















standard CES function assuming equal substitution elasticities
between all factors. It can then be shown (_ see Perrakis (198O)_7
that the variable cost function associated with such a produc-
4
tion function has the following separable form:
(6) C (Q, K; w1#...,wn) = A (Q,K)« B (w,, , . . . ,wn) .
Since C(') is concave in w., it must be the case that B(-) is
concave in w.; and since Cv < 0, also Av < 0. We therefore have
that CT. (•) = Av(-) B(w1,...,w ), which is a convex function of
j\ j\ in ——^^~
w. (since a concave function multiplied by a negative constant- 10 -
is convex). Therefore, from the preceding discussion, it is
possible to conclude that with production functions of the type
given by (5), a risk neutral firm will always decrease its de-
mand for capital in response to increased uncertainty in factor
prices. In other words, since Q is being held fixed, the firm
will opt for a less capital-intensive input mix.
3. A Steady-State Model Involving Costs-of-Adjustment
In contrast to the previous assumption made, that output
be exogenously predetermined, it is often more realistic to
assume that the actual level of output to be produced is an ex
post decision variable. The problem with relaxing this assump-.
tion in the preceding framework was that the size.of the firm
would become indeterminate. Hartman (1972) provides an elegant
solution to this problem by introducing a cost-of-adjustment
term applicable to investment in a dynamic model of the firm;
a solution which does not entail the same logical difficulties
associated with the postulate of decreasing returns to scale,
directly applied to the production function in the previous mo-
del. From this model, Hartman derives the proposition that a
mean-preserving spread in output prices and wage rates has the
effect of stimulating a firm's investment expenditures. This
result has no counterpart in the static model employed previous-
ly, the results of which are only comparable to the steady-state
solutions of the dynamic model. For that reason, the corollary
proposition is proven here, that mean-preserving spreads in prices- 11 -
will always lead to an increase in the desired steady-state
capital stock of the risk-neutral firm. But more importantly
for our purposes, it will also be shown that this need not imply
that the firm would choose a more capital-intensive output mix.
Rather, under a sufficient flexible production technology, as
measured by the elasticity of substitution, it can be shown
that the average steady-state capital intensity of the firm is
reduced. •
The following exposition is considerably simplified if we
revert to the assumption of only two factors of production:
Capital and a factor X which is variable in the short-run. The
variable X can be interpreted as an aggregate measure of various
short-run factors of production, g(x..,...,x ), the price of
which is given by the scalar w. The firm's profits in period t
may then be written as:







where I is gross investment and D(I.) is a cost-of-adjustment
term with D'> 0 and D'"> 0. For further simplicity, it is assumed
that the investment cost function is non-stochastic. This is
motivated by the result derived in Hartman (1972, p. 263) that
investment is invariant to mean-preserving spreads in random
terms which shift the investment cost function. The objective
of the firm is to maximize the discounted expected value of (7)- 12 -
summed over all t, subject to the constraint
(8) Kt+1 = (1 - Y) Kt + It,
where y is the (constant) rate of capital depreciation. By this
formulation of the problem, the capital stock for period t must
be chosen in period t-1, before p. and w. are known, while X.
and thus output, F'/ K. , X. /, are chosen after these prices are
known.
Given that this firm approaches an equilibrium size, we
have in the steady-state that K. 1 = K, = K, and therefore that
I. = I = yK. This allows us to delete the time subscript, so
that the steady-state profit function in every subsequent pe-
riod is n = pF l_ K,X_/ - wX - C(YK) . By virtue of constant re-
turns to scale in production, this may be rewritten as
(9) n = Kp </~f(x) - (w/p)x_/- D(YK),
where x = X/K. The necessary ex post profit-maximizing condition
is
(10) f•(x) = w/p,
which, does not involve K directly. From (10) the conditional
demand for the relative factor x is derived as x = x (w/p).
The conditional profit function for every period in the steady-
state may then be written as
(11) n" = Kh(p,w) - D(YK).- 13 -
Since we know from duality theory that profit functions are
convex in factor and output prices, it must be the case that
h(p,w) is a convex function of its arguments.
The ex ante objective of the firm in the steady-state is
to maximize the expected value of n with respect to K. Differen-
tiating (11), we obtain the necessary condition for a maximum,
(12) 6E(lT)/6K = E h(p,w) - YD'(YK) = 0,





The first proposition asserted in the beginning is now
easily established. Since h(p,w) is a convex function of both
arguments, a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of these
variables raises E h(p,w), which by expression (13) warrants
an increase in K in order to reestablish the equality in (12).
In other words, increased uncertainty in factor and output prices
increases the desired steady-state capital stock of the firm.
Consider now the effect of increased uncertainty on the
desired steady-state factor proportions of the firm. From the
necessary optimality condition (10), notice that the optimal
level of x is only a function of w/p and independent of K. This
means that when w and p are evaluated at their mean values, the- 13a -
figure]14 -
desired level of x remains the same as before the increase in
uncertainty. However, the relevant question to ask is, what
happens to the average level of x chosen by the firm. Assuming
that the subjective probability distribution of w and p used
by the firm's decisionmakers is the same as the true distribu-
tion, the average level of x is E(x).As before, then, the be-
havior of E(x) following increased uncertainty hinges on whether
x is a convex or concave function of w and p. Without further
restrictions on the production function this is indeterminate,
but in general it will be the case that x is not a linear func-
tion, so that increased uncertainty will affect the average le-
vel of x chosen.
Let us then confine ourselves to a CES production function,




/p, where - °° < p < 1, and a = 1 / (p-1)
is the elasticity of substitution. Output per unit of capital
is then
(14) f(x) = ^~aR + axx
P_
Using this functional form, the desired level of x can be solved
from (10) to be
w _P_ a Zl
/ 1 r \ v" /— , K « 1 ~ P X "5 P
L V " ~YT '
By taking the second derivatives of this expression with respect
to w and p it is possible to determine whether the function is
concave or convex. Performing this operation yields- 15 -
(16) 6
2x"/(6w)
2 = a l_~2 - p + (1 + p)b_7
(17) 6
2x"/(6p)
2 = c f\ + pb_7.
where a, b and c are positive terms. Of primary interest is
the term b which ends up to be (av/av) x
p, or the relative fac-
tor share of income accruing to X over the share accruing to K.
In figure 1, the unbroken curve gives the combinations of a and
b for which expression (16) is zero. For combinations of a and
b that lie above that curve, x is a convex function of w. Simi-
larly, the dashed curve in figure 1 gives the combination of
points for which expression (17) is zero. Above that curve,x
is a convex function of p.
From figure 1 it is.possible to conclude that the advent
of increased uncertainty in output and factor prices will de-
crease the average steady-state capital intensity of the firm
given that the elasticity of substitution is sufficiently large.
For the case of factor price uncertainty this would always be
true for an elasticity of 1/2 or more, while for output price
uncertainty the corresponding critical value is 1• For illustra-
tive purposes, let us take the traditional example where the
variable X stands for labor. Although there is considerable con-
troversy as to the true elasticity of substitution between capi-
tal and labor, most empirical estimates at the aggregate level
have resulted in values of approximately 1. Empirical values for- 16 -
b, the relative income term of labor to capital in this case,
range between 2 and 4 (approximately 3 in the United States).
Given these parameter values, increased price uncertainty leads
to a less capital intensive input mix.
As mentioned earlier, Hartman (1976) analyzed the absolute
demand for capital by a firm subjected to increasing output price
uncertainty in a model with decreasing returns to scale in pro-
duction. In his specific example, production is given by
Q = / av K
p + aT L
p 7
 P; where 0 < y < 1, which exhibits a con-
*- is. jj —
stant degree of homogeneity, y. He then proceeds to derive a
set of critical values for y and a such that, for any given y
less than 1, if the elasticity of substitution, a, lies above
the associated critical value, increased uncertainty leads to a
lower demand for capital. Since the analysis in this paper fo-
cuses on optimal factor proportions rather than absolute values,
a straightforward comparison is not possible. However, there is
a parallel in that this analysis also relies on decreasing re-
turns to scale in profits, but as a consequence of increasing
investment costs. The other similarity is that the desired capi-
tal intensity of a firm is more likely to fall with increased
uncertainty the higher is the elasticity of substitution.
4. Concluding Remarks
The general conclusion derived in this paper is that the- 17 -
choice of factor proportions by a risk-neutral competitive firm
will be affected by increased output and factor price uncertain-
ty provided that not all choices must be taken under the same
amount of uncertainty. More specifically, when the production
function is restricted to a certain class most commonly used
in practical applications, increased factor price uncertainty
always reduces the capital intensity of the output-constrained
firm. For firms subject to cost-of-adjustment in investment,
but with no constraints on output, the average desired steady-
state capital intensity of the firm is also reduced in response
to increased uncertainty, provided the substitution elasticities
in production are not too inelastic. One way to interpret these
results is that they arise as the consequence of Oi's Price In-
stability Theorem and of something akin to Samuelson's Le :
Chatellier Principle, applied to the firm. Oi's Theorem states
that so long as profits are a convex function of prices, in-
creased variability in their realized values will raise the
average profit level above what it would be had these prices re-
mained constant at their mean values. This presupposes that the
firm be able to respond to changing prices and not have to make
all input decision, as in the case of capital, before the actual
price changes are known. Samuelson's Le Chatellier Principle,
as originally applied to household demand theory, says that the
fewer rationing constraints are placed on the household, the
more elastic will be the response to price changes; see Samuelson
(1965, p. 168). The analogy to draw here is that, for those- 18 -
practical cases examined, with a less capital-intensive input
mix a firm is in a better position to respond more elastically to
ex post price changes by varying the amounts of variable produc-
tion factors used, and thereby take better advantage of the
profit opportunities afforded by increased price variability.
The focus of this analysis was on factor proportions rather
than on absolute amounts. This appears to be a more appropriate
reference point when the general equilibrium implications of
this partial equilibrium analysis are considered. If the abso-
lute levels of capital and labor, say, are exogenously given
to an economy as a whole, then increased factor and output price
uncertainty would lead to a fall in the rental-wage ratio,
again under the proviso that the substitution elasticities are
not too low. However, if we allow for possible factor unemploy-
ment, we should observe a decrease in capital intensity, and
thus also a decline in average labor productivity. Perhaps it
is not such a coincidence, then, that the increased price va-
riability observed in the 19 7O's should have appeared at about
the same time as the dramatic slowdown in labor productivity
growth and in the growth of capital-labor ratios observed in
most industrialized economies; see, e.g., Baily (1981).- 19 -
Footnotes
See also Dietrich and Heckerman (1980).
2
Perrakis
1 (1980) erroneous conclusions can be traced back,
I think, to an oversight of this condition.
Let us represent the random variable w as w = ae + b, where
e > 0 is a random variable and a and b are non-stochastic
parameters.. A mean-preserving spread in w then involves both
an increase in a (which amplifies the variability of e),and
an appropriate decrease in b so that E/ w_7 remains the same.
4
This can also be proven as follows: Since g(X1,...,X ) is
homogenous of degree p, the production function in (5) may
be written as Q = F(K, X?f (X.j/X . , . . . ,X /X .) . Minimizing
variable costs with respect to {X , ...,X } subject to this
output constraint yields n equations representing the first-
order conditions. Dividing every equation by the first equation
yields the following (n-1) equations:
w2/w1 = f2(x1/xj,...,xn/xj)/f1 n
= Z~p
f (X../X, ,...,x/x.)- z (x./x.)f. (•) 7/
f1(x1/xj,...,xn/xj)
From these equations we can solve for the (n-1) variables,
{X../X ., . . . ,X /X . }, as functions of the (n-1) relative prices
{w^/w.. , . . . ,w /w1 } . We can then invert the production function
to yield
X




which is the conditional demand for factor X.. This process
can be repeated for all j. But in all cases, the term in-
volving Q and K will be the same, so that the cost function
may be written as: C = (_ G(Q, K)Yp_7/_ G (w1 ,w2, . . . ,wn) _/.
The author wishes to thank James Albrecht, Egbert Gerken,
Raghbendra Jha, and members of the Economics Workshop at
the University of Maryland for many helpful comments and
suggestions.- 21 -
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